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BALANCING, PROPORTIONALITY, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN COMPARATIVE 




QJJlat is the nature of the role that courts perform when they 
evaluate human rights complaints? Answering this question 
engages two related but contending values in the process of 
protecting human rights through judicial means. The first value 
is that persons are entitled to certain rights and freedoms that 
are either completely outside the controlling power of the 
state, organizations and others in the society, or which when 
they are infringed could trigger an application for judicial 
protection by the victims. The second value is that the state 
can impose limitations on certain rights and freedoms but only 
if it could justify those lin1itations by showing how they further 
overriding public objectives.1 Among those objectives may be 
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David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt & Michael Taggart: "The Principle of 
Legality in Administrative Law: Internationalization as 
Constilutionalization" (200 I) 1 OUCLJ 5 at 6 (describing the culture of 
justification as one which obliges decision-makers "to justify their decisions 
by showing either how the decisions conform to [some values, including 
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to protect the rights of others from violation or to preserve 
overall public order, health, safety and morality. This article 
discusses the evolution of comparative judicial standards for 
the balancing of personal rights and freedoms against the 
interests of the public at large. 
0 ften, a country's constitutional system is central to ho.w 
its courts carry out this balancing exercise. While in some 
systems, the courts are provided guidelines for carrying . out 
this duty, in others they have to develop those standards from 
scratch. In this article, I present a historical account of the 
.. constitutional and judicial practices of two countries - the 
United Kingdom and United States - to illustrate a significant 
divergence in methodology and evolution in this regard. After 
analyzing the principal pillars of the two systems and their 
differences, I will use them as standards to examine the 
tradition of Nigerian courts and highlight what similar or 
distinct methods, if any, they (Nigerian courts) apply. My goal 
is ·therefore not to conduct an inquiry into how Nigeria's 
human rights limitation regime compares to other systems with 
similar constitutional texts, for which the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights would be an appropriate 
comparator. My concern is more with how the constitutional 
models and legal systems in the US and the UK developed 
standards for substantive human rights review and specifically 
the role their courts played in that process. 
I have chosen the UK because of its colonial relationship 
with Nigeria. British legal traditions continue to significantly 
influence the Nigerian legal system. While it will be seen that 
British standards for human rights review have evolved .over 
time, the Nigerian system which borrows considerable doctrine 
from that system has shown little amenability to change. The 
those expressive of human rights], or that they are justifiable departures 
from those values."). 
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British system classically illustrates how judges in a regime 
without a written constitution were not only able to formulate 
standards of review but kept those standards relevant to 
different historical periods. The United States system is 
analyzed as well to show how a system with a written 
constitution like Nigeria's approached similar concerns, and 
again how the role of the courts was central to the 
development of that system. 
This inquiry is crucial to an understanding of Nigeria's 
human rights jurisprudence and any inconsistencies that might 
be present in judicial treatment of human rights cases. I 
challenge the current methods that Nigerian courts adopt for 
reviewing human rights cases. My central argument is that 
there appears to be a degree of uncertainty regarding what 
standards Nigerian courts apply for adjudicating human rights 
complaints. I argue further that this uncertainty could to a 
great extent be explained by Nigeria's legal and con~titutional 
history and its colonial experience. I therefore conclude that 
for Nigerian courts to be effective in adjudicating human rights 
cases, they have to create a consistent standard as well as 
observe and adapt to comparative experiences in their 
methods. 
Courts and the Lure of Balancing 
To appreciate why balancing is important and to underscore its 
role in decision-making, including in adjudication by courts, it 
is appropriate to first clarify the doctrine. According to 
Aleinikoff, it could apply to all arenas where the resolution of 
conflict is the major issue.2 He argues that in almost all 
confliots, especially those that make their way into a legal 
2. T Alexander Alcinikoff: "Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing" 
(1987) 96 Yale I.J 943. 
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system, there is something to be said in favor of two or more 
outcomes. Whatever result is chosen, he continues, someone 
will be advantaged and someone will be disadvantaged; some 
policy will be promoted at the expense of some other. Hence it 
is often said that a "balancing operation" must be undertaken, 
with the "correct" decision seen as the one that yields the 
greatest net benefit. 3 
Aleinikoff's reference to "theories of constitutional 
interpretation that are based on the identification, valuation, 
and comparison of competing interests"4 is especially relevant 
in the context of this article., He speaks, for instance, about a 
"balancing opinion" by which he means a judicial opinion that 
analyzes a constitutional question by identifying interests 
engaged by· the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule 
of constitutional law by explicitly or inlplicitly assigning values 
to the identified interests. 5 For his part, Shriffin sees balancing 
as no more than "a metaphor for the accommodation of 
values. "6 While all legal disputes warrant some form of 
balancing (for example the case of party A being balanced 
against that of party B in ordinary criminal or civil litigation)7 
to work out their resolution, as a constitutional doctrine, 
qalancing has a particular resonance in constitutional theory 
and adjudication. It is, however, in the process of analyzing 
how the doctrine applies in different constitutional systems, 
that divergences become obvious. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid at 945. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Steven Shriffin: "The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away 
from a General Theory of the First Amendment" (1983) 78 Nw UL Rev 
1212 at 1249. 
7. Wallace Mendelson: "The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A 
Reply to Mr. Frantz" (1963-1964) 17 Vand L Rev 479 ("[m]oreover, 
balancing would seem to be implicit in an adversary sys_tem which inevitably 
contemplates at least two sides to every case .. . " at 481). 
Balancing, Proponionality, and Human Rights Adjudication 5 
in Comparative Comext: Lessons for Nigeria 
In human rights cases, I have already identified the 
interests that courts seek to balance: individual rights versus 
government restrictions on those rights . I have therefore 
answered the question, embedded in the doctrine, of "what" 
courts are called upon to balance. The next question is "how" 
this balancing is actually implemented. Implicit in this question 
is an inquiry into the very method that courts adopt in ~arrying 
out the balancing act. Different constitutional jurisdictions use 
. different balancing methods. In the next section I will analyze 
how these methods evolved in the practices of the British and 
American systems in -relation to human rights adjudication as 
well as how Nigerian courts have struggled with such cases in 
the absence of a clear method. 
United Kingdom: From Wednesbury "Unreasonableness" to 
Proportionality Analysis 
The British do not operate a written constitution. Therefore, 
rather than constitutional law, they were more inclined· to 
speak in terms of administrative law.8 But in so far as both 
branches of public law are concerned with evaluating the 
8. An English writer could therefore talk about the "Europeanization of 
English Administrative law" rather than constitutional law. When people 
therefore discussed British constitutional law in the past, it passed for no 
more than a misplacement of terms. See Chris Hilson: "The Europeanization 
of English Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Convergence" (2003) 9 
Eur Pub L 125 at 125; see also PP Craig, Administrative Law (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) · ("[f]or some [administrative law] is the law 
relating to the control of government power, the main object of which is to 
protect individual rights. Others place greater emphasis upon rules which are 
designed to ensure that the administration effectively performs the tasks 
assigned to it. Yet others see the principal objective of administrative law as 
ensuring governmental accountability, and fostering participation by 
interested parties in the decision-making process" at 3). 
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actions of "public authorities"9 that do have implications for 
human rights, the distinction may be redundant from a strictly 
human rights standpoint. The British also did not have, until 
the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, 10 any 
document containing a list of rights to which their citizens 
were entitled. The enactment of the Human Rights Act 
domesticated the Convention for the Protection of Human 
rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 11 
The fact that the British have no written constitution and 
no bill of human rights before 1998, ·is not an indication that 
indiviqual rights were not legally protected. At common law, 
the courts developed adjudicatory standards to test the exercise 
of public powers against rights that had been similarly 
developed by common law processes. But unlike in those 
jurisdictions where constitutionally entrenched rights checked 
legislative authority, in Britain parliament is supreme and has 
powers by legislative means to interfere with those rights 
developed by common law. 12 In reviewing actions deemed to 
have violated human rights under British law, the courts 
seemed to alternate between the principles of 
"unreasonableness" enunciated in the case of Vlednesbury 
Corporation case13 and "illegality, irrationality and procedural 
9. David Jenkins, "Common Law Declarations of Unconstitutionality" (2009) 7 
lnt'l J Const L 183 at 184. 
10. H11111an Rights Act, 1998 (UK), c 42 [H11111a11 Rights Act]. 
11. 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 at 223, Eur TS 5 [European Convention]; 
see Jenkins, supra note 9 (arguing that with the enactment of the H11111a11 · 
Rigllts Act "Parliament 'incorporated' rights enshrined in the European 
Co11ve111io11 011 Human Rights ... giving .them effect in domestic law" at 183). 
12. Jenkins, supra note 9 at 184. 
13. Associated Provincial Picture Houses, limited ·v Wed11esb111y Co1poratio11 
(1948) 1 KB 223 [Wednesbury]; see llzhak Zamir, "Unreasonableness, 
Balance of Interests and Proportionality" (1992) 11 Tel Aviv U Stud L 131; 
J Warren Jones, "The Healthcare Professional and the Bolam Test" (2000) 
188 Brit Dental J 237 at 238; Allan C Hutchinson, "The Rise and Ruse of 
Administrative Law and Scholarship" (1985) 48 Mod L Rev 293. 
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impropriety" as laid down in the Council of Civil Service 
Unions case. 14 
These principles derived from administrative law but were 
used as standards for review of human rights cases as well. In 
Wednesbwy, a local authority had power to grant licenses for 
cinematograph perfomrnnces under the Cinematograph Act 
1909 and could grant a license to do business on Sundays, 
subject to such conditions as the authority might think fit to 
impose. The authority granted the plaintiffs in this case leave 
to perform on Sundays subject to the condition that no children 
under fifteen years of age should be admitted to such Sunday 
performances with or without an adult. The plaintiffs sued on 
the ground that the condition was unreasonable. The court held 
that the local authority had not acted unreasonably or ultra 
vires in imposing the condition. The court, interpreting what 
was meant by unreasonableness in this circumstance, stated 
that: 
It is true that discretion must be exercised 
reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers 
familiar with the phraseology commonly used in 
relation to exercise of statutory discretions often 
use the word "unreasonable" in a rather 
comprehensive sense. It has frequently been 
used and is frequently used as a general 
description of the things that must not be done. 
For instance, a person entrusted with a 
. discretion must, so to speak, direct himself. 
properly in law. He must call his own attention 
14. Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for tile Civil Service, [1985] AC 
374; see Adam Tomkins: "In Defence of the Political Constitution" (2002) 
22 Oxford J Legal Stud 157. 
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to the matters which he is bound to consider. He 
must exclude from his consideration matters 
which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. 
If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be 
said, and often . is said, to b~ acting 
"unreasonably." Similarly, there may be 
something so absurd that no sensible person 
could ever dream that it lay within the powers of 
the authority. 15 
This traditional principle of English public law was the 
only one that the system used for the purposes of substantive 
review but not in the absence of context since the Wednesbury 
standard of "[un]reasonableness" meant · different things in 
different situations. 16 Therefore in applying the standard, 
distinct judicial incarnations of it contested for recognition and 
priority. 17 · 
In some latter judicial decisions, the Wednesbury principle 
was contrasted with newer articulations. While Lord Greene's 
formulation considered an unreasonable decision to be 
"somethi'ng so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream 
it lay within the powers of the authority", or "a conclusion so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have 
come to it" Lord Cooke would later suggest that a decision 
would be . unreasonable simply if it were "one which a 
reasonable authority could [not] reach. "18 Observing these 
articulations, Elliot stated that although Lord Cooke's 
15. Wednesbury, supra note 13 at 229, Lord Greene, MR. · 
16. Mark Elliott: "The HRA 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review" 
(2002) 7 Jud Rev 97 at 100. 
17.· Ibid; see also Jeffrey Jowell: "In the Shadow of Wednesbury" (1997) 2 Jud 
Rev 75. 
18. R v. Chief Constable of Sussex exp International Trader's Ferry Ltd, (1999] 
2 AC 418 at 452. 
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formulation is as reliant as Lord Greene's on the rather vague 
criterion of reasonableness, the two tests are very different in 
character. 19 
Wednesbury was also criticized for other reasons apart 
from its apparent vagueness. Not only was it historically 
presented as a monolithic standard of review; it was also not as 
structured as other comparative standards. At the same time, it 
established a ~igh threshold for public interference with human 
rights because it accorded more intense deference to .the 
judgments of policy makers. 20 These were very significant 
cnt1c1sms. Wednesbury's · flexibility would later give 
expression to a more structured concept of unreasonableness, 
which, according to Elliot, was classically illustrated by 
reference to the divergent modes of substantive review 
operating in the distinct contexts of human rights and economic 
policy cases. 21 Matters of economic policy came to be viewed 
as "not justiciable" or "less justiciable", meaning ·that the 
courts will intervene with the substance of the decision only in 
extraordinary circumstances. 22 In contrast, when decisions 
19. Ibid. 
20. Chris Hilson: supra note 8 at 132. 
21. Elliott: supra note 15 at 101. · 
22. R v. Secretary of State for the E11viro11111elll exp Hammersmith a11d Fulllam 
Lo11do11 Borough Council, [1991) 1 AC 521 (the formulation and 
implementation of national economic policy "is not open to challenge on the 
grounds of irrationality short of the extremes of bad faith, improper motive 
or manifest absurdity. Both the constitutional propriety and the good sense 
of this restriction seem to me to be clear enough, The formulation and the 
implementation of national economie policy are matters depending 
essentially on political judgment. The qecisions which shape them arc for 
politicians to take and it is in the political forum of the House of Commons 
that they are properly to be det?ated and approved or disapproved on their 
merits. If the decisions have been taken in good faith within the four corners 
of the Act, the merits of the policy underlying the decisions are not 
susceptible to review by the courts and the courts would be exceeding their 
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affect human rights, the courts are more willing to review 
administrative decisions. 23 
While appearing to contain a single foundation for 
substantive review, Elliot argues that Wednesbury instead 
concealed a range of different standards.24 As noted above, he 
substantiates this claim by reference to the scale of divergence 
between the kinds of substantive review envisaged between, 
for example, economic policy cases and human rights cases. 
While economic policy cases involve "an unstructured and 
highly deferential form of review," (which could be similar to 
the rational b.asis standard in American practice discussed 
later) , human rights cases involved the courts in a "more 
structured and intensive mode of review"25 (which could be 
strict scrutiny in American practice). Elliot therefore contends, 
as does Hilson, that it is inaccurate to suppose that English law 
through the Wednesbury test adhered to a single principle of 
substantive review. Instead he states that Wednesbury 
reasonableness embraced diversity at both the level of structure 
and the level of intensity with which different types of 
decisions are reviewed. 26 
The recognition in certain quarters that Wednesbury 
reasonableness did not properly prescribe satisfactory 
standards for the review of administrative powers under British 
law became more noticeable after the European Convention 
came into effect in the UK. The British are renowned for 
practicing the dualist form for the reception of international 
proper function if they 'ptestimed to condemn the policy as unreasonable" 
Lord ·Bridgc ar597). : ·i: 
23. Ibid. . ,, ., I • 
24. Supra note 15 at 102. 
25. Ibid. 
26. · Ibid. 
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law into the domestic legal system. 27 However, in Briruf 8 the 
court decided that while unincorporated international treaties 
may not fonn part of British law, where either statute or 
common law is uncertain or ambiguous, the courts may 
legitimately resort to such treaties in order to resolve 
uncertainty or ambiguity. 29 
This dualist practice played quite a significant role in the 
procedure where by European human rights norms and 
jurisprudence came to permeate the . British system of human 
rights review. The historically dualist orientation of the courts 
in the United Kingdom is so well settled that it is not open to 
debate. It could tl1erefore be distinguished from any apparent 
"back-door incorporation" of the kind that the court rejected in 
the case of Chundawadra v. Immigration Appeal Tribunat. 30 In 
that case the court foiled an attempt to invoke the 
administrative law doctrine of legitimate expectation, and 
described it as the "back door" by which tlle claimants sought 
to introduce the European Convention into English law. In 
particular the tribunal held that while tlle European Convention 
could be used in interpreting the law if there was any 
ambiguity or doubt. However, where tlle domestic legislation 
was ·perfectly clear, it could not provide a proportionality test 
as an alternative to Wednesbury unreasonableness. Hunt states 
that such statements " inspired little confidence that England's 
highest courts were capable of responding with imagination to 
27. -Sec generally Anthony Bradley & Keith Ewing: Co11stitwio11al and· 
Administrative Law (Pearson Longman, 2007). 
28. R v. Secret my of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind, [ 1991] 1 AC 
696. 
29. Murray Hunt: Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1998) at 127. 
30. [1988] lmm AR 161 at 174. 
12 The Transnational Human Rights Review 
what [at the time] could scarcely still be called English law's 
'new dimension.' "31 
Though the above scenario presented only discouraging 
possibilities, it was also the case that more than a few experts 
in the British system retained the healthy expectation that if 
international treaties could be used as aid in statutory 
interpretation, their potential use in administrative law was still 
enormous. 32 Hunt again asserts that they might offer a 
constraint on the exercise of broad statutory discretion, which 
was notoriously difficult to challenge by judicial review due to 
the inherently deferential Wednesbury standard. 33 
The literature irresistibly points to the fact that even prior 
to the passage of the Human Rights Act in 1998, and ostensibly 
pushed in that direction by jurisprudence from the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the courts in the UK were 
already looking beyond Wednesbwy as standard for substantive 
review. This happened at a time when the courts had also 
developed a new enthusiasm for interpreting domestic law 
more generally in the light of the European Convention. 34 As 
such, English courts felt obliged, as Hilson expertly articulates 
it, to view "an old principle through a new human rights 
filter. "35 It occurred with minimal flourish in ex parte Smith36 
when the English Court of Appeal attempted "to adapt the 
31. Hunt: supra note 29 at 160. 
32. !bid at 134. 
33 . !bid. 
34. !bid at 139; see also Margit Cohn, "Legal Transplant Chronicles: The 
Evolution of Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the 
·Administration in the United Kingdom" (2010) 58 Am J Comp L 583 at 607 
(since 1948, more than 2500 decisions in the UK have cited Wednesbmy and 
used the term "unreasonable," but of these, 2160 - more than 85% - were 
delivered after January I, 1990 and 1545, or 61 %, were delivered after 
January 1, 2000). 
35. Hilson: supra note 8 at 131. 
36. R v. Ministry of Defence, exparte Smith, [1996) QB 517. 
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traditional Wednesbury basis to provide a standard more in line 
with the proportionality test used in the ECHR 
jurisprudence. "37 According to Sir Thomas Bingham in that 
case: 
The court may not interfere with the exercise of an 
administrative disrrl"timi rm <;uhc::t::intive grounds save if the 
court is satisfied that it is beyond the range of responses open 
to a reasonable decision-maker. But in judging whether the 
decision-maker has exceeded this margin of appreciation the 
human rights context is imponam. I ne more substantial the 
interference with human rights, the more the court will require 
by way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is 
reasonable in the sense outlined above. 38 
Although contested among scholars, Smith was positively 
reviewed for bringing Wednesbury closer to the ECHR 
proportionality standard. Hilson provides two justifications in 
support of this viewpoint even though he agrees with Elliot 
that Wednesbury is a variable rather than a monolithic standard 
of review. First, Hilson states that . the te~t in Smith entails a 
more structured exercise than conventional Wednesbury 
because it invites the courts to engage in a balancing exercise 
between indi~idual rights and competing policy justifications. 
Secondly he points to the heightened standard or intensity of 
review in human rights cases. 39 
Elliot however asserts that, following Smith, the 
assumption that proportionality replaced Wednesbury only 
supports what he sees as the false premise that prior to Smith 
there was indeed a single principle of sµbstantive review. He 
argues that structuring the discourse in this manner "fails to 
37. Ibid. 
38. Supra note 36 at 554. 
39. Hilson: supra note 8 at 132. 
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acknowledge the established tradition of diversity in this area: 
the 'reasonableness or proportionality?' question overlooks the 
existing domestic context into which the proportionality test is 
being introduced. "4° Continuing, he submits that once the 
diversity in the pre-existing context is appreciated, the focus of 
inquiry shifts from the question of whether proportionality may 
replace reasonableness, to the relationship between those 
concepts and especially the way in which the fom1er 
complements the latter by extending the range of options open 
to the reviewing courts. 41 
One striking feature of the British system is that it adopts a 
binary between judicial review of legislation and judicial 
review of executive action and administrative decision-
making. 42 To this point, I have limited my analysis to the first 
limb of this binary: the review of executive and administrative 
decisions. A different set of principles govern judicial review 
of legislation. In theory, under British law the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy coupled with an unwritten 
constitution meant that the judiciary had no role in reviewing 
the validity of legislation. 43 This has, however, since the 
coming into force in the UK of the Human Rights Act of 1998, 
40. Supra note 16 at 102; see also Mark Elliott, "The Human Rights Act 1998 
and the Standard of Substantive Review" (2001) 60 Cambridge Ll 301. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Jeremy Waldron: "The Core of the Case against Judicial Review" (2006) 
115 Yale Li 1346 at 1353. See also Seth Kreimer: "Exploring the Dark 
Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s" (1997) 5 
Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 427. 
43 . Robert B Seidman: "Jurucial Review and Fundamental Freedoms in 
Anglophone Independent Africa" (1974) 35 Ohio St Ll 820 at 826; see also 
Harry H Wellington: "The Nature of Judicial Review" (1981-1982) 91 Yale 
Ll 486 ("(w]e tend to think of courts at common law as acting because the 
legislature has not and as making Jaw the legislature can urunake. When 
statutes are involved, we see courts either effectuating legislative will or, 
through an occasional misreading of legislative intent, as producing an 
incorrect decision that can be remedied easily by legislative reform" at 487). 
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given way to what some describe as "rights review" which 
establishes "a form of judicial scrutiny that can review 
democratically derived decision-making by public authorities 
for compliance with a set of recognized basic rights. "44 
As important in the British context is the distinction 
between strong judicial review and weak judicial review. 
According to Waldron, in a system of strong judicial review 
courts have the authority to decline to apply a statute in a 
particular case (even though the statute on its own terms 
plainly applies in that case) or to modify the effect o_f a statute 
to make its application conform with individual rights (in ways 
that the statute itself does not envisage). Courts here also have 
the authority to establish as a matter of law that a given statute 
or legislative provision will not be applied, so that as a result 
of the doctrines of stare decisis and issue preclusion, a law that 
the courts have refused to apply becomes in effect a dead 
letter. 45 Waldron cit_es some European courts that possess this 
authority and states that, although it appears as though 
American courts do not, the real effect of their authority is not 
far short of this. 46 
In jurisdictions that apply the weak version of judicial 
review, Waldron argues, courts may scrutinize legislation for 
its conformity to individual rights and may decline to apply it 
because rights would otherwise be violated. 47 He cites the UK 
as example of the weak version of judicial review since the 
44. Colm O'Cinneide: "Democracy, Rights and the Constitution: New 
Directions in the Human Rights Era" (2004) 57 Curr Legal Probs 175 at 
176. 
45. Waldron, supra note 42 at 1354. 
46. Ibid at 1355; see also Mauro Cappalletti & John Clarke Adams: "Comment, 
Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations" 
(1966) 79 Harv L Rev 1207. 
47. Ibid. 
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enactment of the Human Rights Act. Under the Act's 
prov1s1ons, courts may review legislation with a view to 
issuing a 'declaration of incompatibility" if the court finds that 
the provision under review is incompatible with a right 
protected under the European Convention. Under the Human 
Rights Act, such a declaration of incompatibility "does not 
affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the 
provision in respect of which it was given; and . . . is not 
binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is 
made. "48 Yet the declaration may· have the effect of causing a 
minister .to initiate legislative procedure . to ameliorate the 
incompatibility. It is perhaps the influence of the European 
Convention that has impelled more intense scrutiny of 
executive, administrative and legislative under the rubric of 
proportionality. 
United States: Balancing, R~tional Basis Review, Strict 
Scrutiny . 
Unlike the UK, the US operates a written Constitution. At the 
time of its promulgation, the US Constitution contained very 
minimal reference to human rights guarantees. 49 This led some 
writers to argue that this was in conformity with the thinking 
of its Framers that the Constitution is essentially designed to 
protect individual rights. 50 Ides and May contend that "many 
of the Framers believed that the political structure created by 
the Constitution was the primary and essential vehicle through 
48. Human Rights Act, supra note 10,"s 4(2), (6) . 
49. Gerald Gunther: Constitutional Law (New York: The Foundation Press, 
Inc., 1985) ("[t] here were relatively few references to individual rights in 
the original Constitution: its major concern was with governmental 
structure" at 406) . 
50. Allan Ides & Christopher May: Examples and Explanations: Constitutional 
Law Individual Rights (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2010) at 1. 
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which to protect the liberty of the people. "51 A textual 
reference to limitations on the authority of state in the 
Constitution is, however, commonly traced to Article IV (the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause) as well as Article 1, 
paragraph 10 (the Contracts Clause). This is aside from the 
prohibition placed on state bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws. 
But later in its development and having regard to the 
particular conditions .of that period, specific human rights 
guarantees were added to the US Constitution by way of 
amendments in 1791. However, unlike contemporary 
understandings of these rights, which qualify them in light of 
overriding public interests, the amendments seemed to have 
granted these rights in absolute terms without any limiting 
possibilities. For example, the First Amendment, which 
established freedom of religion, speech and assembly, 
provided that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiti~g the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances." 
This provision seemed not to leave any room for the 
legislature to control or place limitations on the enjoyment of 
the rights guaranteed. "Congress shall make no law ... " could 
therefore legitimately be interpreted, given its unambiguous 
mandatory appearance, as absolutely prohibitive of any 
legislative regulation of the freedoms mentioned. The analysis 
I shall make in this section is not however limit.~d to the First 
Amendment. It will include subsequent amendments 
incorporating what is commonly referred to as the American 
Bill of Rights. Black describes the Bill of Rights as "any 
51. Ibid. 
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document setting forth the liberties of the people" ,52 thereby 
referring to all provisions of the original Constitution and 
Amendments that protect individual liberty by barring the 
government from acting in a particular area or from acting 
except under certain prescribed procedures. 53 Among these, he 
mentions provisions that safeguard the right of habeas corpus; 
those that forbid bills of attainder and ex post facto laws~ those 
that guarantee trial by jury, and strictly define treason and 
limit the way it can be tried and punished. 54 
Does the US Bill of Rights contain absolute or qualified 
rights? The answer to this q\lestion is obviously consequential 
for how courts approach judicial enforcement. Writing in the 
1960s, Black recognized "a sharp difference of views as to 
how far its provisions should be held to limit the lawmaking 
power of Congress. "55 While one tendency (the "non-
absolutists, " "balancers," or "operationa1ists")56 saw in the 
constitutional prohibitions mere admonitions which Congress 
need not always observe, the other , of which Black himself 
was an in1portant interlocutor, believed that "there are 
'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they we~e put there 
on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant 
52. Hugo L Black: "The Bill of Rights" (1960) 35 NYUL Rev 865. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid at 866. 
56. Alexander Meiklejohn: "The First Amendment is an Absolute" (1961) Sup 
Ct Rev 245 at 248; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, (1961] 366 US 36 
(rejecting the absolutist theory "(a]t the outset we reject the view that 
freedom of speech and association .. ., as protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments are 'absolutes,' ·not only in the undoubted sense 
that where the consti tutional protection exists it m1Jst prevail, but also in the 
sen~e that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal 
reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its history this Court has 
consistently recognized at least two ways ii;i which constitutionally protected 
freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk ... " Harlan J 
at 49-50). 
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their prohibitions to be 'absolutes. "'57 With such divergent 
viewpoints, it will be understandable why still others believed 
the First Amendment to be ambiguous. 58 
The text of the First Amendment, coupled with its 
differing interpretations, made it difficult for the courts to 
respond to claims of violations of the amendment principles. If 
the absolutist argument prevailed, the legislature would not 
have the power to curtail rights thereby enshrined and the 
courts would not have a balancing role to perform. If the non-
absolutists had the upper hand, the courts would be called 
upon to perform the same duty of balancing rights against 
higher societal interests in those situations where the two 
interests are in contention. But even if that duty existed, the 
Constitution itself, quite significantly, did not provide any 
guide or clues to the courts as to how it could be performed. 
Fair enough, the American courts did not have much to do 
in the early stages of constitutional review because as 
important as the absolutist and non-absolutist debate was, a 
different controversy raged among the interlocutors on the 
spread of the principles enunciated in the amendments within 
the US federal structure. The question at issue was Whether the 
provisions of the Constitution and the amendments on 
individual rights limited the powers of the state governments as 
it did those of the federal government. It was widely believed 
in the 191h century that the Bill of Rights did not limit the 
57. Black, supra note 52 at 867. . 
58. Wallace Mendelson: "On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in 
the Balance" (1962) 50 Cal L Rev 821; see also Laurent B Frantz, "Is the 
First Amendment Law? - A Reply to Professor Mendelson" (1963) 51 Cal L 
Rev 729. 
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power of the states. 59 This view was given a judicial stamp of 
approval in the case of Barron v Baltimore. 60 However, with 
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 there was 
an opportunity to extend the application of the Bill of Rights to 
the states. Yet this expectation was scarcely met. According 
to Epp, "the Fourteenth Amendment remained notoriously 
unclear, for the amendment referred only in relatively vague 
terms to the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the 
United States , life, liberty, or property, due process and equal 
protection of laws. 61 An acceptable interpretation of these 
broad terms could not be agreed upon by the courts and. wa,s 
disputed well into the 201h century .62 
In addition to these controversies, neither the Constitution 
nor the Bill of Rights contained in the amendments provided 
the courts with any procedural resources for scrutinizing the 
impact of official actions on human rights with a view to 
offering protection to victims. It was therefore left to the 
courts to develop standards for substantive analysis. 
Historically speaking, though the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was important in articulating the US 
rights tradition, it had only a limited impact for a considerable 
ti~e after its passage. Pettinga states that in the first eighty 
years foqowing its enactment, the US Supreme Court believed 
that it protected only racial and ethnic minorities from 
discrimination through overt or covert classifications which 
disadvantaged them.63 Continuing, he argues: 
59. See Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme 
Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1998) at 30. 
60. Barron v. Baltimore, [1833) 32 US 243. 
61. See Epp, supra note 59 at 30. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Gayle Lynn Pettinga: "Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by 
any other Name" (1986-1987) 62 Ind LJ 779 at 780. 
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Because ·the Court believed the scope of protection was so 
narrow, it interpreted the equal protection clause as scarcely 
limiting state power. State governments were essentially free 
to benefit or burden groups within their borders in any way 
.they saw fit. At times, the equal protection clause hardly 
protected anyone; ethnic and racial minorities could rarely get 
relief from discrimination :with an equal protection challenge~ 
and other groups could never get relief at all. 64 
This situation would later give way in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s, Pettinga recounts, starting with the famous 
Footnote Four of Justice Stone in the Carolene case. 65 In that 
case Justice Stone called for more intense judicial inquiry to 
protect discrete and insular groups that do not have the 
ordinary protection of democracy and therefore are incapable 
of any meaningful or effective engagement with that process. 
However, in spite of this, the court in the Carolene held that a 
piece of economic regulatory legislation was entitled t.o a 
presumption of constitutionality. 
Stone's court also decided that the legislation in question 
should be upheld so long as the government could show a 
rational basis for enacting it. The onus was on the party 
challenging it to show that there was no r~tiona~ connection 
between the government objective that the law purported to 
serve· and the restriction itself. Applied in practice, almos.t all 
goverm:nent objectives succeeded on the rational basis 
justification. There was therefore insufficient protection for 
human rights, particularly the rights of minorities under this 
64. Ibid at 781. .. 
65. United States v. Carolene Products,Co, (1938] 304 US 144. See also Lewis 
Powell J1:. : "Carolene Products Revisited" (1982) 82 Colum L Rev 1087 
(describing footnote four as . "the most celebrated footnote in constitutional 
law" at 1088). See also Bruce Ackerman, "Beyond Carotene Products" 
{1985) 98 Harv L Rev 713. · 
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standard. This led . to the development of what has been 
described as "suspect classification" in American constitutional 
practice, following Justice Stone's view in Carotene. By this 
classification, "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect [and] 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. "66 
Through the doctrine, the courts "concentrate on devising 
complex categories and subcategories for identifying the kinds 
of rights infringement that merit constitutional review and the 
level of scrutiny that should apply to each one. 67 Therefore the 
suspect classification doctrine presumed .a law unconstitutional 
if it used certain classifying traits. 68 Unlike in rational basis 
analysis, in suspect classification cases, in order to survive 
such rigid or strict judicial scrutiny, the impugned legislation 
or action must be necessary to the accomplishment of a 
compelling state interest. 69 Here, unlike with rational basis 
doctrine, the onus· was on the government to show that 
compelling interest. 
Legislation that demanded strict scrutiny, Gunther states, 
require a far closer fit between classification and statutory 
66. Korematsu v. United Stares, [1944] 323 US 214. 
67. Moshe Cohen-Eliya & lddo Porat: "American Balancing and German 
Proportionality: The Historical Origins" (2010) 8 Int'l J Const L 263 at 264. 
68. Margaret Bichler: "Suspicious Closets: Strengthening the Claim to Suspect 
Classification and Same-Sex Marriage Rights" (2008) 28 BC Third World 
Ll 167 ("[r]acial classifications have consistently been regarded as suspect 
because racial minorities have historically been disenfranchised from the 
political process and have a signifying trait (skin color) that is immutable 
and readily visible" at 170); see also Joseph Tussman & 'Jacobus ten Broek, 
"The Equal Protection of the Laws" (1949) 37 Calif L Rev 341 at 344; R 
Richard Banks, "Race-based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal 
Protection Doctrine and Discourse" (2001) 48 UCLA L Rev 1075. 
69. Elizabeth S Anderson, "Integratfon, Affirmative Action, and Strict 
Scrutiny" (2002) 77 NYU L Rev 1195; John Galotto: "Strict Scrutiny for 
Gender, via 'Croson'" (1993) 93 Colum L Rev 508. 
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purpose than the rough and . ready flexibility traditionally 
tolerated by the old equal protection. 70 In his words: 
[M]eans had to be shown "necessary" to achieve 
stafutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" 
ones. Moreover, equal protection became a 
source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the 
areas of the new equal protection had to .be 
justified by "compelling" state interests' not 
merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state 
ends.71 · 
The US Supreme Court with Earl Warren as Chief Justice 
would soon kick-start an ambitious policy of identifying new 
areas appropriate. for strict scrutiny. The court did so by 
searching for two major characteristics: the presence of 
suspect classification or the impact of legislation on 
fundamental rights and interests. 72 While racial discrimination 
maintained its significance as grounds for intervyntion based 
on the established suspect classification rule, and fundamental 
rights could be identified by recourse to the amendments to the 
Consritution, what constituted fundamental interests was far 
less clear. While the list of such interests developed by the 
Warren court were modest to say the least (including voting, 
criminal appeals and the right to interstate travel73), 
conunentators searched for justifications for including 
analogous situations of which "welfare benefits, exclusionary 
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zoning, municipal services and school financing came to be the 
most inviting frontiers. "74 
Yet there were those who reasoned that the Supreme 
Court's analytical position· in human rights cases defied an 
easy categorization into situations requiring rigid scrutiny and 
those warranting only deferential rational basis considerations. 
Such persons argued that a variety of standards had been 
applied to resolve equal protection cases. For example, in San 
Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez75 Justice 
· Marshall rendered a dissenting opinion where he ·observec;l that 
the Supreme Cm,Jrt apparently seeks to establish how equal 
protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which 
dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or 
mere rationality. On the contrary, he stated, the Court's 
decisions defy such easy categorization. Justice Marshall held 
that a principled reading of what the Supreme Court had done 
revealed that it had applied a spectrum . of standards in 
reviewing discrimination claims under the Equal Protection 
Clause. This spectrum, he continued, clearly comprehended 
variations in the degree of care with which the Court would 
scrutinize particular classifications, depending on the 
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely 
affected and the invidiousness of the basis upon which the 
particular classification is drawn. 76 
Such thinking later produced a tl1ird standard described as 
"intermediate" level scrutiny or "rational basis scrutiny with a 
74. Ibid. 
75. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, [1973) 411 US 1. 
76. Justice White adopted this position in, for example, Vlandis v. Kline, [1973) 
412 US 441 (stating that "it is clear that we employ not just one or two, but, 
as my Brother Marshall has ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards"' at 
458). . 
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bite. "77 This standard is clearly more intensive than the 
deferential or rational basis review yet less demanding than the 
rigidity of strict scrutiny. The level of scrutiny protects 
persons within a quasi-suspect classification system and is 
associated with sex discrimination cases like Craig v Boren18 . 
In that case, the court majority held that classifications by 
gender must serve impor.tant governmental objectives ·and must 
be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. 
Pettinga identifies three major reasons why the Court 
created this third category. First, many scholars criticized the 
human rights doctrine. Second, growing public awareness of 
discrimination against groups other than racial groups had 
increased demands for judicial protection. Finally, the advent 
of legal aid for disadvantaged constituencies influenced the 
development of creative judicial intervention on behalf of 
indigents. 79 Under this intermediate analytical standard, the 
court may look more closely at the ends and means of the 
challenged statute, instead of merely pronouncing it valid or 
invalid under traditional analysis. 80 The Court stated that it 
"does not accept every goal proffere4 by the state, and if an 
alternative means exists which does not disadvantage the 
protected group, the Court can prompt the legislat:Ure to 
employ the alternative means by invali~ating the legislation. "81 
A comparison of contemporary British and American 
standards of review reveals certain clear points of interest. 
77. See Pettinga: supra note 63 at 784. See also Jeremy B Smith: "The Flaws of 
Rational· Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court should Acknowledge·its 
Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classification based on Sexual 
Orientation" (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 2769. 
78. Craig v Boren, [1976) 429 US 190. 
79. Supra note 63 at 784. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Ibid at 785. 
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Perhaps most relevant is that while BritiSh practice is based on 
proportionality (though they are loathe to so describe it), in the 
US the standard tilts towards balancing. The question then is 
whether a real difference exits between "proportionality" and 
''balancing.'' To the extent that under both systems serious 
efforts are made to actually strike a balance between individual 
rights and governmental interests, one might conclude that no 
real difference exists between them. Under both approaches, 
when governmental action affects the human rights of 
individuals, the governmental interest warranting such effect 
must be compelling and the means chos~n must be necessary to 
achieve that purpose. 
But Chaudhry believes there is actually a difference 
between American balancing and British proportionality by 
reference to what he calls "decisional deference" particularly 
in the context of American practice. He notes that in most 
jurisdictions (particularly those applying the proportionality 
model), rights adjudication consists of a two-stage process that 
determines first whether a right is violated and second whether 
that violation is justified according to a proportionality 
analysis. In these systems, he continues, rights are generally 
given a broad interpretation, and countervailing interests are 
addressed exclusively under the rubric of proportionality. 82 
This contrasts to "definitional balancing" as he calls it in the 
context of the American system. This, he says, is a mere one-
stage approach "which conflates the scope of a right with its 
strength. "83 . What is not contested, however, is that at this 
point in both the American and the British systems, once a 
governmental action or legislation engages a recognized human 
right, a greater burden is placed on the government official or 
82. Sujith Choudhry: " After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the 
Postconflict State" (2010) 6 Ann Rev Law Soc Sci 301. 
83. Ibid at 314. 
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institution to justify that action or law. In deciding whether or 
not that burden is discharged, the right in questio~ ai:id the 
governmental interest justifying its restriction are balanced 
through a structured process. 
Nigeria: Struggling. for Justification; Inverting the in 
Favorem Libertatas 
While in both the UK and US, the cou~ts have applied judicial 
tools to demarcate rights and governmental interests, and 
weigh them on the balance; Nigeria has adopted a different 
approach. Rather than allow the courts to strike the balance 
from scratch, the constitution provided a rather rough outline 
of how the courts could perform that function. Sectio?- 45 of 
the 1999 Constitution provides that: 
45(1) ~othing in section& 37 [privacy], 38 [conscience, 
thought and religion], 39 [expression], 40 [assembly] 
and 41 [movement] shall invalidate any law ·· that is 
reasonably· justifiable in a democratic society - (a) in 
the interest of defence, public safety, public order, 
public morality or public health; or (b) for the purpose 
of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons 
(2) An Act of the National Assemb_ly shall not be 
invalidated by reason only that it provides for the 
taking, during periods of emergency, of measures that 
derogate from . the provisions of section 33 or 35 of this 
Constitution; but no such measures shall be taken in 
pursuance of any Act during any period of emergency 
save to the extent that those measures are reasonably 
justifiable .for the purpose of dealing with the situation 
that exists during that period of emergency: 
:~~ i 
. . ·. 
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Provided that nothing in this section shall 
authorize .any derogation from the provisions of 
section 33 of this Constitution, except in respect 
of death resulting from acts of war or authorize 
any derogation from the provisions of section 
36(8) of this Constitution. 
This provision sets out the general limitation on the human 
rights provisions of the Nigerian Constitution. Noticeably, the 
· limitation applies to specific guarantees . This · supports the 
proposition that ~t does not apply to ·all of the rights that the 
Constitution enshrines. In addition, some of the guarantees 
contain independent lin1itation clauses. For example, while 
section 33(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to life in 
general terms (save in the execution of a death sentence),84 
sub-section (2) thereof qualifies the right by delimiting · 
· situations. where life may be taken. Such situations include 
defending another perso.n from unlawful violence, in defense 
of property, death arising while someone is ·carrying out a 
lawful arrest, to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained, ·Or for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection 
or mutiny. 
It is equally worth noting that the limitation clause is not 
applicable to section 34 of the Constitutfon which places an 
absolute prohibition on the use of torture and other inhuman or 
degrading treatment. The section also disallows slavery and 
servitude absolutely as well as the performance of forced and 
compulsory labor barring the exceptions highlighted. 
84. Nigeria is among several African countries where the death penalty is still 
applied as a criminal sanction. However, some countries on the continent 
such as South Africa have abolished the practice. See Dirk van Zyl Smit, 
"The Death Penalty in Africa" (2004) 4 Afr Hum Rts Ll 1; Lilian Chenwi, 
Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights 
Perspective (Cape Town: ABC Press, 2007). 
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Furthermore, the right to liberty, guaranteed under section 35, 
may be restricted under certain circumstances and in 
accordance with certain procedures. Where these are invoked, 
the Constitution contains ample provisions for securing 
humane treatment , including prompt and expeditious trial, the 
right to silence and legal consultation, a right to a written 
explanation of the reasons for arrest or detention, and the right 
to bail. 85 
Finally, the right to fair hearing in section 36 is placed 
outside both the reach of the general limitation provisions in 
section 45, and any specific limitation for that matter. ·Not 
even emergency considerations could place this guarantee at 
risk. Rather the proviso to subsection 45(2) captures the well-
known principle of nullum crimen sine Lege - that only 
offenses in existence at the time of an accused person's 
offending action can be prosecuted (that is, there should be no 
retroactive criminalization) and that no heavier punishment 
should be imposed than was in force at the time that the 
offence was allegedly conunitted. 
For· the purposes of analyzing the limitations in the 
Nigerian Constitution, one might group the rights into three 
distinct categories. The first category consists of those rights 
that are exempted from any restrictions in the interest of 
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public 
health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
persons . In this category are freedom from torture and other 
similar freedoms. The other category consists of those rights 
that could be re.stricted on the basis of these justifications but 
only in times of emergency. Captured here are the rights to 
life, freedom from forced labor, personal liberty and freedom 
from discrimination. Rights in the third and final category are 
85. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 s 34(2)-(7). 
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those that could be derogated from at any time on the basis of 
public order, morality, health, etc. 
As in the two jurisdictions already examined, the role of 
Nigerian courts in cases alleging human rights abuses is to 
read the guarantees relied upon in those cases and then decide 
if the abuses complained of could be justified under any of the 
limitations allowed by the Constitution. It is by no means a 
light duty. When constitutional terms are as open-textured as 
they often are, courts interpreting them must scrutinize 
whether they are liberal (in· favor of rights i.e. acting in 
. favorem libertatas) or conservative (expanding the limitations 
to the detriment of rights). Apart from the words of the 
Constitution itself, the Nigerian courts do not have any further 
resources that might guide their interpretive orientation. The 
task is therefore a complex one, especially since, according to 
Okonkwor, the Nigerian Bill of Rights differs from the rest of 
the Constitution because it is a statement of principles that 
involves the application of non-legal criteria. 86 
He argues further that when interpreting these human 
rights prov1s1ons, the courts should consider the 
reasonableness and justifiability of legislative and executive 
acts. This, he says, compels a subjective, rather than a purely 
objective approach that adheres to strict statutory construction. 
Therefore, he asserts, the subjective approach involves the 
measurement of reasonableness and justifiability in terms of 
the historical setting, the local political and social conditions 
and local standards of acceptability. 87 Though writing in the 
context of the human rights provisions of the Nigerian 
Independence Constitution of 1960 and the Republican 
Constitution· of 1963, Okonkwor's argument is, however, also 
86. R. Chude Okonkwor: "The Legal Basis of Freedom of Expression in 
Nigeria" (1978) 8 Cal W Int'I Ll 256 at 265. 
87. Ibid. 
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appropriate for this analysis of the human rights behavior of 
the courts under the 1999 Constitution. The human rights and 
the limitation provisions in Nigerian constitutions since 1960 
have all been quite similar. 
Regarding the general limitation clauses, Okonkwor, as 
well as Nwabueze, have described them as manifes tly vague 
and tlexible.88 This is ostensibly because it cannot be stated 
with any degree of certainty what the Constitution means by 
the phrase "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. " 
This would seem to be the bane of all. efforts to expand judicial 
protection of human rights in Nigeria by judicial means. Yet 
this has not elicited as much academic attention as is seriously 
needed. In this regard, one might notice how different the 
Nigerian limitation regime is from its South African 
counterpart, for example. The Nigerian Constitution does not 
have an equivalent to section 36(1)89 of the South African 
Constitution that points toward the development of standards of 
human rights adjudication analogous to proportionality 
balancing. 
The Nigerian rights limitation regime therefore does not 
allow the same structuralism and the development of clear, 
standard steps for effective balancing of rights against 
88. Ibid; see also B 0 Nwabueze, A Co11stit11tio11al Histo1y of Nigeria (London: 
Longman Inc., 1982) at 118. 
89. This provision essentially entrenched the proportionality standard of human 
rights analysis by providing that: "(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may 
be limited only in terms of law of general-application to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, r..king into account all 
relevant factors, including (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of 
the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) 
the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose." In the succeeding subsection it is provided 
that: "(2) Except as provided in subsection (l) or any other· provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights." 
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governmental interests. A literal reading of the Constitution, a 
tradition which Nigerian courts have largely adopted in the 
context of its limitation regime, renders the possibility of 
effective judicial affirmation of rights illusory. 90 This is not 
only true of situations where the courts render positive 
judgments in human rights cases, but also in those cases where 
the outcomes are negative. Because these decisions are 
arbitrary and devoid of clear standards and tests for justifying 
governmental intrusions on rights, there is a strong likelihood 
for them to be inconsistent and contradictory. 
In the circumstanc~s, the distinction that Alexy draws 
between the construction of rights as rules and the construction 
of rights as principles is especially relevant to the Nigerian 
practice. 91 Rather than construct rights as principles, the dearth 
of analytical resources equivalent to what is available under the 
South African constitution has foisted on Nigerian courts a 
situation in which all rights are construed merely as rules. But 
not all rights may be interpreted as rules. According to Alexy, 
rules are norms that require something definitively. They are 
definitive commands (his emphasis) of which their form of 
application is subsumption. 92 Alexy argues that "[i]f a rule is 
valid and applicable, it is definitively required that exactly 
what it demands be done. If this is done, the rule is complied 
with; if this is not done, the rule is not complied with. "93 
On the contrary, principles, according to Alexy, are norms 
requiring that something be realized to the greatest extent 
90. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 67 at 266 (suggesting that the balancing 
mechanism which in more ways than one resembles proportionality analysis 
was devised by the United States Supreme Court to overcome an excessively 
literal reading of the constitutional text). 
91. Robert Alexy: "The Construction of Constitutional Rights" (2010) 4 Law & 
Ethics Hum Rts 20. 
92. Ibid at 21. 
93. Ibid. 
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possible, given the factual and legal possibilities at hand. 
These, he argues, are optimization requirements (his 
emphasis). He states that "[t]hey are characterized by the fact 
that they can be satisfied to varying degrees, and that the 
appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on what is 
factually possible but also on what is legally possible. "94 Alexy 
argues that when human rights are conceived as rules rather 
than principles, balancing is eschewed. Of this situation, which 
he refers to rather pejoratively as "freedom from balancing" 
there is positivist ingredient which makes all questions 
connected with the application of constitutional rights' 
resolvable only by traditional canons of interpretation. This is 
done by appealing to the wording of the constitutional . rights 
provisions, to the intentions of those who framed the 
Constitution, and to the systematic context of the provision 
being interpreted.95 
Applied to the Nigerian context, Alexy's double-headed 
theories of "subsumption" and "optimization" have stark 
significance. While those provisions in the constitution that 
contain non-derogatory rights could be interpreted as rules, the 
rights to which the limitation provisions are applicable would 
be construed as principles. The first category of rights function 
like rules because they express imperatives that are boundless 
and limitless. For example the constitutional prohibition of 
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment can only be 
implemented by an absolute prohibition of those practices. The 
prohibition is either honored or it is not. There are no two 
ways and no short .cuts. There is therefore no' room for the 
application ·of balancing and proportionality, or in Alexy's 
94. Ibid. 
95. Ibid at 22. 
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words, "freedom from balancing" applies. Nothing is available 
to balance or to render proportional. 
On the other hand, those constitutional rights provisions 
that are derogable constitute principles to the extent that they 
can be limited: What the constitution mandates regarding this 
category of rights is that they be protected or, as Alexy would 
argue, optimized to the greatest extent possible. For the simple 
reason that in this case there are two competing values - the 
rights of individuals and government restrictions on them in 
the name of the public good ·- a balancing process is 
warranted. What the proportionality doctrine accomplishes in 
this regard is to ensure that a fair balance is struck between 
these two values and especially that the means used to restrict 
the right in question is not more than what is necessary to 
accomplish the stated governmental objective. 
Since the majority of the rights enshrined in the Nigerian 
Constitution fall within the latter category, they should attract 
the application of the balancing scheme. But the words 
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society," are far too 
vague to provide an objective guide for balancing. Nwabueze 
also claims that the introductory phrase "Nothing in this 
section shall invalidate any law ... " seems to imply a 
preswnption in favor of the validity of a law imposing a 
restriction. 96 Other commentators share Nwabueze's position. 97 
96. Nwabueze, supra note 88 at 118. 
97. Okonkwor, supra note 86; see also Kenneth Robert-Wray, "Human Rights 
in the Corrunonwealth" (1968) 17 Int'l & Comp LQ 908 (noting that the 
Nigerian human rights provisions had been informed largely by the 
Europea11 Co11ve11tio11 and stating that "[t]he point has more than once been 
made that Articles 8 to 11 of the [European] Convention, which corresponds 
to sections 23 to 26 [sections 37 to 40, 1999 Constitution] of Nigeria's 
Constitution, permit such qualifications as are 'necessary in a democratic 
society'; and that by substituting 'reasonably justifiable' for 'necessary' the 
Constitution permits greater latitude. It does. What is 'reasonably justifiable' 
may not be 'necessary.' Article 15 (emergencies) is even tighter; the 
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The statement "Nothing in this section shall invalidate any 
law ... " seems to cast the onus on the person challenging a 
human rights abridging law to show that it is not reasonably 
justifiable. Nwabueze suggests that the Constitution could have 
taken a more favorable approach to the rights in question and 
placed a greater burden on govermuental justification if it had 
read instead: "any law derogating from a guaranteed right 
shall be invalid unless it is reasonably justifiable ... "98 
Nwabueze 's suggestion tallies substantially with Taiwo'$ , 
position on the same issue. The latter observes that frame.rs of 
successive Nigerian constitutions have always concluded that it 
is appropriate to include this clause in the constitutional text. 
This, he argues, leads to a conclusion that "such clauses 
express attitudes that cut across time periods and individual 
preferences among the framers. "99 He therefore asks the 
question that the constitutional provision points inexorably to 
but only in reverse order: "Do Nigeria1s constitutional framers 
mean to suggest that a democratic ~odety, ·so-called, may 
interfere with an individual 's right to [for example] respect for 
his private and family life, home and correspondence, if such 
interference is 'in the interest of defence, public safety , public 
order, public morality, public h_ealth or economic well-being of 
the community? " 100 Taiwo concludes that if this question yields 
a positive answer, then that is a sure sign that the framers of 
relevant words being 'strictly required'; and Article 1 (the right to life) goes 
even furthe r with 'absolutely necessary,' whereas section 18 of the 
Constitution dilutes this to 'reasonably justifiable.' Out in my submission, if 
the validity of measures adopted by Parliament or the Government is liable 
to be canvassed in a court of law, this change of wording is, to say the least, 
most desirable." at 922). 
98. Ibid. 
99. Olufemi Taiwo: "The Legal Su~jc<.:t in Modern /\fri<.:an .· Law: J\ Nigerian 
Report" (2006) 7 Hum Rts R<.:v 17 at 2-1. 
100. !hid. 
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the constitutions did not take rights seriously, [and] left no 
room for doubt that they were aware of the many philosophical 
conundrums that their proposal might generate and seemed to 
have adopted a crude utilitarian approach in which the rights of 
an individual may be sacrificed for the welfare of the many. 101 
Among the earliest cases of relevance when analyzing the 
attitude of Nigerian courts with regard to what it means for 
legislation to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society 
is that of Cheranci. 102 It is important to note that this was a 
decision of the Northern Region of Nigeria High Court written · 
by a non-Nigerian judge, Justice Bates. In the judgment, Bates 
stated that there was a presumption that every law made by 
parliament was constitutional and that the courts should 
recognize this fact, and therefore apply restraint in deciding 
whether a particular law is reasonably justifiable or not. 103 He 
101. Ibid. 
102. Clteranci v. Cllera11ci, ll960] NRNLR 24. 
103. It is unclear how this presumption of constitutionality differs from the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Canada, for example, which also 
practiced the British system prior to adopting the Canadian Charter of 
Rights a11d Freedoms, 1982 knew better than to continue with the British. 
human rights tradition once the Charter was promulgated. See Hon. Justice 
JC Macpherson, "The Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms on Executive and Judicial Behaviour" in Gavin W Anderson ed, 
Rights & Democracy: Essays in UK-Canadian Constitutionalism (London: 
Blackstone Press Limited, 1999) ("[o]ur Co11stifUtio11 Act 1867 states in its 
preamble that Canada is to have a Constitution 'similar in principle to that of 
the United Kingdom.' Of course, the anchor of the Constitution of the 
United Kingdom is the principle of parliamentary supremacy. That principle 
was also central to the Canadian Constitution for 115 years. Moreover, the 
courts adopted principles of interpretation which tended to respect the role 
and laws of government - e. g. the presumption of constitutionality, the 
principle of strict construction, the aspect doctrine and functional 
concurrency. Those principles are simply irrelevant in Charter litigation. 
Government lawyers now must expect to defend their Jaws on the merits. In 
so doing, they must be prepared to argue civil liberties doctrine at a 
sophisticated level and to articulate candidly and persuasively the policy 
factors underlying the challenged law. Moreover, in some aspects of the 
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seemed to suggest that judges "should not lightly disregard the 
voice of the people expressed through their legislators. "104 
Justice Bates also held that to be reasonably justifiable, a 
restriction on a fundamental right must be necessary for the 
relevant purposes (set out in the Constitution) and must not be 
excessive or out of proportion to the objects it seeks to 
achieve. Finally, he held that the presumption places the 
burden of showing that the law is not reasonably justifiable on 
the complaining party. 105 
Perqaps in one view it is not worthwhile to spend a lot of 
time on
1 
the Cherancz judgment because it was delivered by a 
regional High Court and is therefore of insignificant 
precedential value in Nigeria 's common law setting. Yet it is 
an important decision because had Nigerian courts maintained 
some parts of the structure it laid out, there could have been 
better prospects for a more effective judicial approach to the 
enforcement of rights and to the conception of acceptable 
limitations on those rights in the country. There are two 
observable parts to the court's reasoning in Cheranci. On the 
one hand, it presumes the constitutionality of every law passed 
by parliament. On the other hand, the judgment set out a 
structure, which it would apply to every decision regardless of 
whether or not a particular law restricting constitutionally 
l 
guaranteed rights is reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society. I will proceed to examine the justification offered in 
favbr of the presumption of constitutionality. Next, I will 
Charter analysis, there is a presumption against the government. For 
example, when a law has been found by a court to violate a Charter right, 
' the onus shifts to the government to demonstrate that it should be saved as a 
'reasonable limit ... "' at 131-132). 
H». Kenneth Roberts-Wray: "Human Rights in the Commonwealth" (1968) 17 
Int'l & Comp LQ 908 at 924. 
105. Ibid. 
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show why the court's approach to reasonable justifiability in 
Cheranci offers a yet to be realized opportunity for expanding 
human rights protection. 
The justification offered for the presumption that the 
legislature always acts constitutionally is that law-making is a 
policy function and that elected representatives arc better 
placed to decide matters of policy than an unelected judiciary. 
In other words this assertion concerns the supposed counter-
majoritarian nature of judicial review . 106 According to Roberts-
Wray, the primary responsibility for governing the country 
rests with th~ legislature and the executive, and it is neither th~ 
function nor the wish of the judiciary to hinder or interfere 
more than necessary. 107 He argues further that if the law 
requires the courts to review legislation and discretionary 
administrative action, it should not be incumbent on judges to 
substitute their own view of how the discretion should be 
exercised for the views of those primarily responsible, 
provided that what has been done is reasonably justifiable.1°8 
As in Cheranci , the court in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Chike Obi109 came to the conclusion that the 
mere fact that a law has been made with the approval of1the 
106. See Mark A Graber: " Foreword : From the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to 
Juristocracy and the Political Construction of Judicial Power" (2006) 65 ~d 
L Rev l; Barry Friedman, "The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part One : The Road to Judicial Supremacy" (1998) 73 NYU L 
Rev 333 at 335; Samuel Issacharoff, "Constitutionalizing Democracy in 
Fractured Societies" (2004) 82 Tex L Rev 1861 (equating judicial rcvie:-v 
with constitutionalism which "exists in inherent tension with the democratic 
commitment to majoritarian rule. At some level, any conception Of 
democracy invariably encompasses a commitment to rule by majoritariah 
preferences, whether expressed directly or through representative bodies. At 
the same time, any conception of constitutionalism must accept pre-existing 
restraints on the range of choices available to governing majorities"). 
107. Roberts-Wray, supra note 104 at 922. 
108. Ibid. 
109. Director of Public Prosecutions v C//ike Obi, [1961] l All NLR (Pt. 2) 186. 
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legislature, representing the people, is sufficient to trigger 
judicial restraint. To further this restraint, the courts have 
adopted a practice that has been variously characterized. Yusuf 
and Ogbu-Nwobodo call it a "plain fact" jurisprndential 
approach. 110 0 kere refers to it as literal ism or mechanistic 
interpr~tation borne out of political expediency. 11 1 Another 
conuuontator has described the Nigerian Supreme Court's 
approap1 to human rights adjudication as austere and as 
discounting the normative force of .the explicil language of the 
humatj rights guarantees of the Constitution.112 It is also 
sugge~ted that this court minimally considers the general or 
specific context or structure of the Bill of Rights. 113 · 
This is in part traceable to the history of the Supreme 
Cour/ as well as the training and process of recruiting judges. 
It is. worth underscoring lhat Nigerian courts have totally 
lackdd a reasonable opportunity to develop a human rights 
adjudicatory philosophy suitable to Nigeria's specific 
( 
coilltitutional history. In this regard, British practice, although 
in ip.any respects now divergent from the constitutional course 
Nideria chose at independence, continues to lurk in the 
I l . Hakeem Yusuf: "Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional 
I 
Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria" (2008) 30 Law & Pol'y 194 
at 212; Samuel Ogbu-Nwobodo, "Pluralism in the Nigerian Constitutional 
Framework: A Comparative Study of United States of America and Republic 
of India" in Chima Cenlus Nwcze, ed, Co111e111pormy Issues 011 Public 
l11ternatio11al and Comparative law: Essays in Honor of Professor Christian 
I Nwachukwu Okeke (Lake Mary: Vandeplas Publishing, 2009) at 347. 
Ill. B Obinna Okere: "Judicial Activism and Passivity in Interpreting the 
Nigerian Constitution" (1987) 36 ICLQ 788 at 803. 
p2. Solomon Ukhuegbe: Human Rights Decision-Making in Emergent Cowts: 
' The Supreme Court of Nigeria, 1961-2000 (PhD Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, 2009) [unpublished]. 
' I 13. Ibid. 
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background like a dead hand from the past. 114 It is significant 
that the problematic limitation clause was a British invention. 
The constitution the British delivered on the eve of Nigeria's 
independence marked the introductiou of this clause into 
Nigerian constitutional practice. That clause, and the 
interpretation Justice Bates gave it in Cheranci, demonstrates 
its bold British footprints. 
It suggested that legislative power loomed over the 
Constitution's human rights guarantees. Justice Batas called 
this the presumption of the ·constitutionality of statutes.\But this 
presumption is only of limited significance to the \broader 
issue. It exists in one form or another in most constl~tional 
systems. However, it is not cast in concrete, rathe~, it is 
rebuttable. The bigger obstacle then is to adopt an 
interpretation of this presumption in line with that of Justice 
Bates in Cheranci. Not only did he view this presumption as a 
form of restraint on judicial activity, he further interpr~ted it 
as placing the onus of proving that a law is not " reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society" on the party alleging that 
such a law ~u~tails constitution~lly ent~enched ~ights. \~his 
looks very sumlar to the American rat10nal basis doc(\"me, 
which was found to insufficiently protect human rights. Bht in 
the British practice prevailing in that Nigerian con ext, 
parliamentary supremacy was dominant and actually qualified 
114. Sandra Pullerton Joireman: " Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rulr of 
Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy" (2001) 39 J Modern Afr Stud F 1 
("[i]ndeed, in Nigeria and Kenya at independence, the courts and legal 
systems became closer to English common law than they had been un~er 
British colonial rule" at 577); see also Robert Seidman, "The ·Reception'1of 
English Law in Colonial Africa" in Yash Ghai, Robin Luckam & Franhs 
Snyder, eds, The Political Economy of Law: A 171ird World Reader (NJw 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989) ("all the judges in Colonial Afri~a 
were non-African until the tag end of the imperial era, when a few We;t 
African judges were appointed, all of whom, however, were trained an':i 
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the rights recognized at common law. Legal education and 
judicial experience revolved around this tradition. 
In Nigeria, the limitation clause from which this tradition 
was deriv.cd was repeated in the 1979 Constitution and again in 
the 1999 Constitution. Nv,1abuczc observes that Nigerian 
judges arc handicapped by their English education and judicial 
techniques that insulate them from the values and needs of the 
Nigerian people. 115 He asserts that: 
Their [Judges'] minds have become imbued with 
ideas about the unquestionability of 
parliamentary legislation under English law and 
about the perfection and synunetry of the 
common law as to render them almost incapable 
of performing effectively the more creative role 
demanded of them by constitutional adjudication 
under a written constitution. They are unfamiliar 
with the constitutional decisions of courts in the 
U.S. and with the vast literature of American 
constitutional law, which have greater relevance 
to the problems that are presented to them than 
the English decisions which are their stock-in-
trade. 116 
I now turn my attention to those portions of the decision in 
Cheranci that could have made judicial protection of human 
rights in Nigeria more robust and effective, had the courts 
followed and developed them. I take this approach, not only 
because Cheranci remains the only Nigerian court decision that 
115. Ben 0 Nwabueze: Judicialism in Commonwealtll Africa: The Role of Courts 
in Government (London: C Hurst, 1977). 
116. Ibid at 311. 
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offers an expanded definition and explanation of "reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society'', but also because it clearly 
introduced the element of balancing and proportionality that is 
now the hallmark of acceptable reviews of laws and actions 
that restrict human rights. As surprising as it may be, Justice 
Bates, the author of the judgmenl, was in fact an English 
judge. Iu Cheranci, Justice Bates decided that a reasonably 
justifiable restriction on human rights "must not be excessive 
or out of proportion to the objects which it is sought to 
achieve.'·' He introduced the element of "proportion", which if 
maintained at that time would have established a departure 
from Nigeria's dependency on unhelpful English case-law and 
practice and the development of jurisprudential principles 
flowing directly from the very text of the Constitution. 
There is therefore a relationship between the failure to 
consolidate on the proportionality part of the Cheranci decision 
and the persistence of what I identified earlier as "adhocism", 
"plain factism" and "literalism." If Nigerian courts had 
followed the proportionality reasoning behind the Cheranci 
decision, it would have been wrong to argue that the 
Constitution's limitation provision placed· the burden on the 
individual challenging a law or executive action to prove that 
such law or action is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society .117 Proportionality analysis and the balancing of rights 
and interests usually proceeds in stages with specific questions 
asked at each stage. 
One major question that usually arises within the 
proportionality/balancing matrix is: what legitimate 
governmental objective is a particular restriction on a 
117. Okonkwor, supra note 86 (arguing that "the words 'nothing in this section 
shall invalidate any law .... ' ... seem to be tilted in favor of the derogatory 
law, which thereby shifts the onus to the challenging person to prove that the 
law is not reasonably justifiable" at 263). 
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constitutionally guaranteed right serving? It would appear 
improper to place the burden of identifying and justifying the 
objective on the party challenging the restriction. The rationale 
for this position is simple: who better than the govenunent to 
convince the· court of lhe legitimale goal of a challenged law or 
other governmental aclion and, in the Nigerian context, how 
such a law or aclion could be reasonably justified in a 
democratic society. In fact, it is a contradiction to require that 
the restriction on a right be proportionate while at the same 
time placing ~e burden of proving proportionality on the 
person challenging the restriction. 
The failure to stand by the Cheranci proportionality 
formula has only led to a hazy and fragmented judicial 
landscape in which courts reach decisions without offering any 
coherent explanation for doing so. As a result, the legal 
problems are dealt with on a case-by-case basis often with the 
instant case benefitting little or not at all from previous cases 
by way of a structured process. In historical terms, two cases 
illustrate this situation. In Williams v. Majekodunmi (No. 3), 118 
the plaintiff who happened to be a prominent lawyer 
challenged a restriction order placed on him by the 
government. While he argued that the order was not 
reasonably justifiable, the government argued otherwise. In its 
judgment, the Supreme Court held that the restriction order 
was not reasonably justifiable. When interpreting the words 
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society," the court 
stated: 
Those words ... must be read in the context of the 
Constitution, and more particularly in the 
context of Chapter III in which they occur. The 
118. Williams v. Majekodu11mi, (No. 3), [1962) l ALL NLR 413. 
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Chapter confers certain fundamental rights 
which are regarded as essential and which are to 
be maintained and preserved; and they are to 
serve as a norm of legislation under majority 
rule, which is tbe form or rule pervading the 
constitutions. If they are to be invaded at all, it 
must be only to the extent that is essential for the 
sake of some recognized public interest, and 
may not be farther. 119 
Quite surprisingly, in Adegbenro v. Attorney Ge.neral of 
the Federation, 120 which arose from similar facts as the 
Williams' case, the Supreme Court held that the restriction 
order placed on the plaintiff was reasonably justifiable. The 
court in this case reasoned that: 
[T]here has in this case before us been shown to 
be ample grounds for the restriction placed on 
the movements of the plaintiff in the interest of 
peace and avoidance of bloodshed as deposed to 
by the defendant's witness. We have it before us 
that before the purported appointment of the 
Plaintiff there was a Premier of the Western 
Region who is alleged to have been removed 
from office; that as a result there were two 
factions in the party in power in that Region; 
that the plaintiffs attempt to hold a meeting of 
the House of Assembly ... sparked off the 
disturbance which has led to the restriction order 
served on the Plaintiff; and finally, that the 
plaintiff desires to return to the duties of Premier 
119. Ibid al 426. 
120. Adegbenro v. Attorney General of the Federation [1962) 1 ALL NLR 431. 
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of that Regiou .. In my judgment the steps which 
have been t~ken are reasonably justifiable as a 
preventive measure to attain peace and order. 121 
Invoking only_ a-: _couple of British authorities by way of 
rationale, one author has argued that the court was right to 
reach two contradictory judgmcnts in these cases with similar 
facts. 122 I am reluctant to agree with his conclusion. While the 
two cases did have some distinct facts, which may have played 
a role in the position adopted by the court, the judgments, 
especially in the ~atter case, could be rightly questioned . In 
both cases the court appeared more desperate to justify the 
restriction than to strike a balance between the restriction and 
the rights of the individuals concerned. Even while ruling in 
favor of the challenger in the earlier case, the court did not 
develop any helpful standards that could have benefitted 
subsequent litigation. For all intents and purpose.s, the court 
simply said that the restriction was not reasonably justifiable. 
A critic of the court's position could reach the exact 
opposite conclusion much in the same manner as the court 
itself. That is why justification is crucial. And it does not seem 
likely that any such justification could be advanced without at 
121. Ibid at 439; see Ch11lcwu111a & Others v. Commissioner of Polin·. 12005) 8 
NWLR (Pt 927) 278 [C/wkw11111a]; and see !11spector General 1>/ ·l'olice v All 
Nigeria Peoples Party & Otlters, (2007] 18 NWLR (Pt l066) 457 lANPP] 
(for more recent examples of this degree of inconsistency in decision-
making. Both cases were delivered by the Nigerian Court of Appeal. They 
had similar facts and concerned the same provision of· the Nigerian 
Constitution. Yet in the latter decision, the court did not even as much as 
acknowledge that a similar decision had been rendered in the past on same 
legal provision and similar facts). 
122. Kaniye S. A. Ebek:u: "Constitutional Guarantee of Personal Liberty and 
Preventive Detention in Nigerian Law" (1995) 7 Afr J Int'I & Comp L 620 
at 637. 
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least attempting some balancing activity. It is a balancing 
process such as this that leads to the development of a 
structure and therefore a standard. Thus, absent any clear 
structure from which justification could be deduced in a logical 
fashion, it was not that surprising that the court in each case 
reached opposite conclusions. 
More recent court decisions, especially since the 1999 
restoration of civil rule in Nigeria, suggest that the culture of 
lack of balancing in human rights analysis is now firmly rooted 
in its judicial practices. In this regard, the cases of Chukwuma 
and Others v. Commissioner of Police123 and Inspector General 
of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party and Others124 decided 
between 2005 and 2007 by the Nigerian Court of Appeal, are 
relevant to this analysis. In both cases, the question was 
whether it is constitutional, given the right to association and 
assembly in the 1999 Constitution, for the Public Order Act 
1990 to require a police pem1it to properly and peacefully 
conquct public assemblies, meetings and processions. Both 
were decided by the Court of Appeal though at two different 
divisions. 
The police in the Chukwuma, the first case, had invaded a 
private hotel where some Nigerian citizens belonging to a 
socio-cultural organization were gathered for a meeting. They 
broke. up the gathering and sealed off the venue on the pretext 
that no police permit had been obtained for the meeting. The 
Court of Appeal held that the police were right to disband the 
meeting because the organizers did not obtain the required 
permit. In the Chukwuma judgment, the court did not even as 
much as recogniz·e the constitutional right of assembly and its 
relationship to the Public Order Act, particularly with regard 
123. Chukwuma, supra note 121. 
124. ANPP, ibid. 
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to balancing the right against the social good of maintaining 
public peace. 
In ANPP, the second case, twelve registered Nigerian 
political parties conunenccd the legal action requesting the 
Court of Appeal to determine whether a police permit or any 
other similar written offi~ial authority is required to hold a 
rally or procession in any part of Nigeria. They also sought to 
know whether the provisions of the Public Order Act which 
prohibit rallies or processions without a police pennit are 
illegal and unconstitutionaJ in light of the guarantee of the right 
of assembly under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. 
In my opinion the Court of Appeal in ANPP correctly 
identified the main question for consideration which was 
whether the provisions of the Public Order Act, particularly 
those which required conveners of meetings or political rallies 
to obtain police permits in the exercise of their constitutional 
rights to freedom of assembly and expression, is reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society. 125 It came to the conclusion 
that the police permit requirement cannot be used as a 
camouflage to stifle the fundamental rights of citizens. On this 
basis it deemed several sections of the Public Order Act to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution and declared them null and 
void. 
Why would the court reach contradictory decisions in two 
cases with clearly similar facts? In ANPP, the latter case, the 
court referred to Chukwuma but was ambiguous about whether 
or not it was overruling this older judgment. Though the court 
attempted to distinguish the ~wo cases, it did so in a manner 
that is, in my view, harmful of the right rather than protective 
of it. I say "harmful" because the court in ANPP, after 
125. ANPP, supra note 121. 
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recalling that Chukwuma had preserved the Public Order Act, 
stated: 
[T]he court never decided that the Inspector 
General of Police [IGP] was empowered to issue 
police permit or disrupt any public gathering for 
which no license has been issued by the 
Governor of a state or his authorized agent. 
Superior police officers referred to under section 
4 of the Police Order Act · means the 
Corn.missioner of Police or any of the senior 
police officers under the state police command. 
The [IGP] has no s~tutory backing to usurp the 
powers of the governor to issue license for 
public meetings or delegate such powers to the 
Commissioner of Police. The appellant has 
failed to appreciate the trend in all democratic 
countries whereby the right to hold.meetings and 
assemblies is no longer subject to the whims and 
caprices of the government or secu.rity agents. 126 
This reasoning shows considerable hesitancy at both ends 
of the justification spectrum. It did not ·.clVerrule the earlier 
decision. Yet it did not preserve it in the manner it was 
initially ~endered. The court's difficulty in ANPP appears to be 
a reluctance to act decisively by overruling the earlier 
decision. By trying to distinguish between the IGP and the 
State Commissioner of Police in terms of who has overall 
competence over. the issuance of licenses for meetings and 
assemblies, it avoided the larger question of whether the Public 
Order Act can possibly co-exist with the rights enshrined under 
the Constitution. ·Although the court in the ANPP reached the 
126. Ibid, at 490. 
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correct verdict overall, its failure to reject and nullify the 
Chukwwna verdict leaves far too much uncertainty in the 
jurisprudence. 
But beyond the contradiction in the overall outcome of 
both cases, !here is the larger issue of the absence of any 
strnctured justification in either of the decisions. This further 
stTengthens my contention that Nigerian case law lacks clear 
judicial standards for justifying intrusions on constitutionally 
protected rights. Evidence discussed above of how such 
questions are dealt with in other jurisdictions shows that it is 
insufficient to skirt around the issues and draw· a conclusion 
without laying out the standard by which that conclusion was 
reached. There is therefore an element of reflexivity and 
arbitrariness in the approach of the highest courts which 
inevitably sips down the lower judicial cadres. By this, I mean 
the tendency among Nigerian judges to rely on open-ended 
rationalizations in their judgments that make it ha.rd .to pin 
them down to any discernible analytical pattern. Could this be 
a deliberate ploy by judges to create an environment that 
justifies their decisions without regard to consistency or 
integrity? If this is the case, what reasons could be adduced for 
it? I 
Karibi-Whyte, a l~e'tited Judge of the Nigerian Supreme 
Court offers what wouid. : s~em to be an insider's explanation 
for the ambivalent posture of tlle court. He states that ·in 
coming to these decisions the court applied ordinary rules of 
construction of statutes. The constitutional provisions were 
const~ed, he continued, as though they were ordinary s~tutes 
of the imperial Parliament or the local legislature as the case 
may be. No special emphasis, he said, was laid on the fact that 
the liberty of the citizen was involved and that in such cases 
the benefit of doubt in a decision between the executive and 
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the citizen should be given to the citizen. In conclusion, he 
advised that, in construing the provisions of statutes which 
infringe upon human rights guarantees, the court should in all 
cases lean towards the liberty of the subject but should be 
careful by not to go beyond the natural construction of the 
statute. 127 
This is a clear indication of the court's failure to carry out 
any balancing scheme, which significantly differentiates the 
Nigerian courts' approach to human rights from the practices 
of the other jurisdictions analyzed in this paper. I had shown 
how American balancing is generally similar to the 
proportionality analysis that is a feature of both British and 
South· African contemporary constitutional cultures. In these 
jurisdictions, the courts have developed standards of analysis 
that guide any court faced with a human rights case, regardless 
of the nature of the right involved. In all three jurisdictions, 
the questions asked at each stage of the analysis are similar. It 
is, however, difficult to point to comparable standards in the 
practices of Nigerian courts. This has telling consequences for 
uniformity in court practices as well as for the objectivity of 
decisions rendered. It must be clear that the approach of the 
courts is consistent, otherwise precedent is of minimal benefit 
and there is an increased chance that courts faced with similar 
facts will reach contradictory decisions, as is currently the 
case. 
Why Nigeria Needs a Proportionality Template 
Given the points I have made in the above sections, it seems 
the Nigerian judiciary can no longer avoid a proportionality-
based system of constitutional rights review. This is 
127. Adolphus G. Karibi-Whyte: The Relevance of the Judiciary in the Polity - in 
Historical Perspective (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 
1987) at 58-59. 
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imperative, not only because the constitutional provision that 
governs the limitation of human rights in Nigeria warrants 
doing so, but also because the proportionality-based system has 
many inl1erent advantages, which explain why it is widely 
adopted by constitutional regin1es around the world in 
contemporary times. 128 Among other jurisdictions, it is used by 
the European Court of Human Rights, 129 the United 
Kingdom, 130 South Afr ica, 131 India, 132 South Korea, 133 
Germany, 134 Canada, 135 New Zealand, 136 and Brazil. 137. The 
128. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews: "Proportionality Balancing and 
Global Constitutionalism" (2008) 47 Colum J. Transnat'l L 72; David M 
Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004) at 159; Stephen Gardbaum: "Limiting Constitutional Rights" (2007) 
54 UCLA L Rev 789; David S Law, "Generic Constitutional Law" (2005) 
89 Minn L Rev 652; Francis G Jacobs, "Recent Developments in the 
Principle of Proportionality in European Conununity Law" in The Principle 
of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe, Evelyn Ellis, ed, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1999) at 1. 
129. Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 67. 
130. Julian Rivers: "Proportionality. and Variable Intensity of Review" (2006) 65 
Cambridge Li 174; Margit Cohn, "Legal Transplant Chronicles: The 
Evolution of Substantive Review of the Administration in the United 
Kingdom" (2010) 58 Am J Comp L 583. 
131. S. v. Zuma & Others, [1995] (2) SA 642; Richard Goldstone, "The South 
African Bill of Rights" (1997) 32 Tex lnt'l Li 451. 
132. SR Bommai v. Union of India, [1994] 2 SCR 644; Gary Jeffrey Jacobson, 
"Bommai and the Judicial Power: A View from the United States" (2008) 
Indian J Const L 38. 
133. Kyung S. Park: "Korean Principle of Proportionality, American Multi-
leveled Scrutiny, and Empiricist Elements in U.S. - Korean Constitutional 
Jurisprudence" (2001) 1 J Korean L 105. 
134. Susanne Baer: "Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional 
Court" (1998) 5 Colum J Eur L 249; T Jeremy Gunn, "Deconstructing 
Proportionality in Limitations Analysis" (2005) 19 Emory lnt'l L Rev 465. 
135. R. v. Oakes, [1986) I SCR 103; see also Dieter Grimm, "Proportionality in 
Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence" (2007) 57 UTLJ 383; 
Sujit Choudhry, "So what is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades. of 
Proportionality Analysis under the Canadian Charter's Section l" (2006) 34 
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proportionality principle does not appear to discriminate in 
terms of the legal systems to which it might apply. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that the above-mentioned 
countries comprise common law as well as civil law 
jurisdictions. Moreover, not only in multiple domestic legal 
arena, but also transnational courts and instirutious, have 
adopted the proportionality principle. 138 
Furthermore, it is as equally present among countries 
whose constitutional traditions allow the courts to discover the 
limitations of rights through practice and experience, such as 
for example the United States139 and United Kingdom, as it is 
Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 501; Lorraine Weinrib: "Canada's Charter of Rights: 
Paradigm Lost?" (2002) 6 Rev Const Stud 119. 
136. Minislly of Transport v. Noon: [1992] 3 NZLR 260; Jan Stemplewitz, 
"Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Case for Parliamentary 
Responsibility for Human Rights Protection" (2002) VUWL Rev 14. 
137. Alonso Reis Freire: "Evolution of Constitutional Interpretation in Brazil and 
the Employment of Balancing 'Method' by Brazilian Supreme Court in 
Judicial Review" online: 
< hup:l/www.e11elsy11.gr/papers/w 151 Paper%20by %20Prof%20Alo11so %20 
Reis%20Freire.pdf>; Viad Perju: "Proportionality and Freedom: An Essay 
on Method in Constitutional Law" Boston College Law School Paper Series, 
7-1-201 l. online: 
<//up ://lawdigi1aleo111111011s. be. edu/cgi/vieweontent. egi ?article= J 363&eom 
ext= lsfp&sei-
redi r= 1 &referer=hlfp %3A %2F%2Fsellolar.google. ea %2Fsellolar%3Fstarr 
%3D20%26q %3Dproportio11ality %2Banalysis %2Bin %2Bbrazi l %2Beo11stit111 
ional%2B/aw%26'11%3Den %26as _sdt %3D0%2C5Hseareh = %22proponion 
ality %20a11alysis%20brazil%20eo11sti1111io11al%20law%22 >. 
138. Axel Desmedt: "Proportionality in WTO Law" (2001) 4 J Int'l Econ L 441; 
Carol Harlow: "Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and 
Values" (2006) 17 Eur J Int'I L 187; Benedict Kingsbury, "The 
Administrative Law Frontier in Global Governance" (2005) 99 Am Soc'y 
Int'I L Proc 143. 
139. Although balancing and proportionality are sometimes viewed as distinct 
standards, some scholars see the difference between them as being that 
between six and half a dozen. See Gregoire CN Webber: "Proportionality, 
Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship" (2010) 23 Can 
JL & Jur 179 (" [t]o claim that constitutional law has entered the age of 
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in other jurisdictions like South Africa and India whose 
constitutions prescribe a range of permissible limitations to 
constitutionally enshrined human rights. Therefore, Nigeria 
might adopt the proportionality standard for the simple reason 
that it offers a more consistent mechanism for justifying 
governmental abridgment of human rights and also because a 
large number of states have already embraced it. As such, 
Nigeria would not be doing anything extraordinary in looking 
that direction as well. 
The adoption of a proportionality mechanism by Nigerian 
courts would also free the courts from the rules versus 
principles difficulty that Alexy identified. With a balancing 
regime in place, the Nigerian courts will rely less on 
traditional constitutional canons of interpretation that they have 
hitherto used but w~ich have in no way deepened the 
understanding and enforcement of rights in the county. 
Moreover, balancing ensures that the burden of proof is 
properly fixed. It places the onus on the government to justify 
a restriction on the basis of compelling objectives for which 
there are no alternative options. A proportionality mechanism 
would also have significance for uniformity in the judicial 
construction of rights and for certainty in legal outcomes. 
Moreover, a proportionality-based system of rights review 
balancing - that it embraces discourse and practice of balancing - is no 
exaggeration). Indeed, constitutional law is now firmly settled in this age: 
for example the Canadian scholar David Beatty maintains that 
proportionality is an 'essential, unavoidable part of every constitutional text' 
and 'a universal criterion of constitutionality'; German scholar Robert 
Alexy, for his part, maintains that balancing 'is ubiquitous in law' and that, 
in the case of constitutional rights, balancing is unavoidable because 'there is 
no other rational way in which the reason for the limitation can be put in 
relation to the constitutional right'" at 179). 
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seems more impartial and neutral140 than the current standard-
free mechanism that Nigerian courts operate. It offers a more 
coherent justification of court judgments because there is an 
opportunity in the balancing process to weigh all of the values 
implicated, rather than simply reaching a decision in a 
capricious fashion. 
Deeiding human rights cases arbitrarily has consequences 
for the courts and the judge as Wechsler expertly articulated 
several decades ago. 141 He was of the view that both the judges 
who decide human rights cases and non-judges who criticize 
those judgments are under an obligation to indicate the 
standards by which they arrive at their choices and positions. 
Wechsler's position bears being reproduced extensively: 
If courts cannot escape the duty of deciding 
whether actions of the other b~anches of the 
government are consistent with the Constitution, 
when a case is properly before them in the sense 
I have attempted to describe, you will not doubt 
the relevancy and importance of demanding 
what, if any, are the standards to be followed in 
interpretation. Are there, indeed, any criteria 
140. See Webber, ibid (underscoring one of the major contentions of 
proportionality proponents, that the system "attempts to depoliticize rights 
by purporting to turn the moral and political evaluations involved in 
delimiting a right into technical questions of weight and balance" though he 
questions this same contention when arguing that "the attempt to evade the 
political and moral questions inherent in the process of rights reasoning is 
futile (because] identifying the interests that are to count and determining 
their weight cannot proceed apolitically and amorally" ar 188); see also 
Stavros Tsakyrakis: "Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?" (2009) 
7 Int'l J Const L 468 (stated that "balancing, in the form of proportionality, 
is nothing but a manifestation of the perennial quest to invest adjudication 
with precision and objectivity" at 469). 
141. Herbert Wechsler: "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" 
(1959) 73 Harv L Rev 1. 
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that both the Supreme Court and those who 
undertake to praise or to condemn its judgmen~s 
are morally and intellectually obligated to 
support? Whatever you may lhink to be the 
answer, surely you agree with me that I am right 
to state the question as the same one for the 
Court as for its critics. An attack upon a 
judgment involves an assertion that a court 
should .have decided otherwise than as it did. Is 
it not clear that the validity of an assertion of 
this kind depends upon assigning reasons that 
should have prevailed with the tribunal; and that 
any other reasons are irrelevant? That is, of 
course, not only true of a critique of a decision 
of the courts; it applies whenever a 
determination is in question, a determination that 
it is essential to make either way. 142 
Wechsler added that a judge's decision should not "turn on 
the immediate result" 143 because that would then imply that 
"the courts are free to function as a naked power organ, that it 
is an empty affirmation to regard them ... as courts of law. "144 
Otherwise courts would only be doing "ad hoe evaluation" (of 
the kind that I think Nigerian courts are guilty) which 
Wechsler believes poses the deepest problem for American 
constitutionalism "not only with respect to judgments of the 
courts but also in the wider realm in which conflicting 
constitutional positions have played a pa.rt in our politics. "145 
142. Ibid at 10-11. 
143. Ibid at 12. 
144. Ibid. 
145. Ibid. 
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In spite of its global appeal, proportionality analysis is also 
often criticized. Among these criticisms is the lack of clarity as 
to "what is weighed (interests, principles, rights, 
considerations); how it is weighted (with what metric); and 
who is doing - or should do - the balancing (judges or 
legislators"). 146 Arguably, the goal of human rights is not only 
to protect certain individual fundamental interests from 
arbitrary state power but also from collective interests. 147 It 
follows therefore that any document for the protection of 
human rights already gives priority to rights. This, it ·is further 
argued, already reflects a balance, the outcome of which must 
be that human rights are to be protected before other interests 
are even taken into consideration. 148 As such, Tsakyrakis asks 
the question, "[i] f that is so, what does it mean to say that the 
issue is to strike a further balance between the general interest 
of the community and individual rights?"149 
. As significant as this question is, it ignores an important 
fact that comparative constitutional rights enforcement must 
grapple with. The understanding of the value of rights in a 
constitutional system is not uniform across all jurisdictions. 
While in some jurisdictions it is taken for granted that rights 
will always prevail over governmental and collective interests; 
and that the individual deserves protection from the invasive 
activities of these social actors, in other jurisdictions, like 
Nigeria, the reverse appears to be the case. Not only are 
individual rights subordinated to governmental and collective 
interests~ in fact some in Nigerian society believe that it is the 
government that should be protected from the individual in 
spite of its awesome powe:rs. Societies like Nigeria cannot 
146. Tsakyrakis, supra note 140 at 470. 
147. Ibid at 475. 
148. Ibid at 476. 
149. Ibid. 
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ignore the imperative of balancing and proportionality because 
the level of tension between the interests involved suggests no 
better or more appropriate means of resolving of them. 
Conclusion 
I end this article where it started: serious interests arc in 
contention in every effort to protect human rights by judicial 
means. Most legal systems recognize this fact. They therefore 
have devised mechanisms and methods that .enable the courts 
to carefully balance those interests in order to reach the most 
appropriate and objective decisions. Because a variety of rights 
are often at risk of infringement and litigation to remedy this 
can come in large numbers, there is a need for . a balancing 
mechanism which ensures that regardless of the nature of the 
right involved, the quest~ons surrounding it .are answered in 
such a manner that the decision in any given case lays a 
foundation upon which similar cases could be approached in 
fu~re. This ensures that decisions are not reached arbitrarily. 
It also ensures that subjectivity does not trump objectivity 
given that when there are clear standards for balancing the 
interests in contention in human rights cases, it does not matter 
much who the judge is. The same standard governs all similar 
cases. The law is more certain and precedent is more 
meaningful. 
From every indication, the Nigerian judiciary does not 
seem to have established objective standards by which to 
decide human rights cases. This creates a situation where such 
cases are approached. on an ad hoe case-by-case basis with the 
possibility that contradictory decisions could be delivered in 
cases with similar facts. Because of the lack of objectivity in 
such decisions, the courts are often accused of having rendered 
them for less than honorable calculations. The practices of 
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some of the jurisdictions discussed in this article indicate that 
this is a concern that must be grappled with in order to breathe 
confidence into the human rights adjudication process. There 
seems to be a convergence around establishing relatively clear 
standards for resolving the questions which human rights cases 
present to a legal system. Such standards can be established 
lhrough balancing or proportionality analysis. 
In Nigeria's case, dealing with the challenge has not been 
helped by the country's legal history and the doctrines of the 
British legal system that a colonial relationship fostered after 
independence. While the British system from . which the 
Nigerian equivalent was based has gone through various 
phases culminating in the passage of the 1998 Human Rights 
Act and the movement of British courts towards a substantive 
standard of human rights review based on proportionality, the 
Nigerian system remains rooted in its immediate post-
independence traditions. This tradition, which has not helped 
the legal protection of human rights, cannot be reformed soon 
enough. Legal education which inculcates these concerns (and 
in particular comparative doctrine) is therefore necessary at 
this point. 
